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Abstract
This paper investigates the relationship between cancer diagnosis and the labor
supply of employed men over the age of 65. While almost 60% of male cancers are
diagnosed in men over the age of 65, no previous research has examined the effect
that cancer has on this age group, which is surprising given the relevance of this
group to public policy. With data from the Health and Retirement Study, I show
that cancer has a significant negative effect on the labor supply of these workers.
Using a combination of linear regression models and propensity score matching, I
find that respondents who are diagnosed with cancer work 3 fewer hours per week
than their non-cancer counterparts. They are also 10 percentage points more likely
to stop working. This reduction seems to be driven by a deterioration in physical
and mental health.
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Highlights
- This paper studies the effect of cancer on the labor supply of employed men over the
age of 65.
- Respondents diagnosed with cancer work 3 fewer hours per week than non-cancer ones.
- They are also 10 percentage points more likely to stop working.
- This reduction seems to be driven by a deterioration in physical and mental health.
- The effect doesn’t differ by the employer-sponsored insurance status of the respondents.
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1 Introduction
One of the most common health shocks that a worker can face is cancer. As of 2014, the
American Cancer Society (ACS) estimates that there are 14.5 million Americans alive who
have been diagnosed with cancer at some point in their lives (American Cancer Society,
2016a). Concerning yearly diagnoses, they expect that almost 1.7 million people will be
diagnosed with cancer in 2016 (American Cancer Society, 2016a). For comparison with
the other severe health shocks, the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention report
that 800,000 people have a stroke and 735,000 have a heart attack every year (Centers for
Disease Control and Prevention, 2015, 2016). Due to the sheer number of diagnoses, it is
important for policy makers to be aware of the impact that cancer has on employment.
Since cancer is the most common severe health shock, a large literature has developed
over the past 15 years which focuses exclusively on the effect that cancer diagnosis has on
labor supply. However, despite this previous research, one area has received little to no
attention: the effect of cancer on the labor supply of workers who are employed past the
age of 65 at the time of diagnosis. This is surprising for a number of reasons. The first
is that the majority of cancer diagnoses occur in people over the age of 65. The National
Cancer Institute estimates that the median age of cancer diagnosis is 66 (National Cancer
Institute, 2015). Focusing on males specifically, the ACS estimates that the majority of
new cancers, 56%, will be diagnosed in men who are at least 65 years of age (American
Cancer Society, 2016b). The second reason is that the labor force participation rate for
older workers has been steadily increasing for a number of years. According to the Bureau
of Labor Statistics, men between the ages of 65 to 74 have a labor force participation rate
of 31% (Bureau of Labor Statistics, 2015). Given that the population of males between
the ages of 65 to 74 is over 12 million, this is not a negligible portion of the labor market
(Bureau of Labor Statistics, 2015). Finally, due to the persistent threats of cuts to Social
Security and Medicare, this is a group whose labor market response to health shocks is
extremely policy relevant.
In spite of the lack of research on this topic, a robust examination of the effect of
cancer on the labor supply of workers over the age of 65 is required for the following
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reasons. First, the percentage of the labor force made up of workers over the age of 65 is
growing. In 2024, workers between the ages of 65-74 will make up 6.5% of the labor force,
compared to 4.4% in 2014 (Bureau of Labor Statistics, 2015)1. Given that people who
work past the age of 65 are likely to be healthier, better educated, and more motivated
than the workers who are already retired, the results from previous studies of younger
cancer survivors cannot simply be extrapolated to this population. While workers who
work past the age of 65 in the future may differ from workers who work past 65 today
(since the regular retirement age is being raised from 65 to 67) knowing whether their
labor supply response is similar to contiguous age groups can help us understand whether
the mechanisms that lead to reductions in labor supply at younger ages are exacerbated
or improved at older ages.
Second, even though the regular retirement age is being raised, 65 is still the age
at which people become eligible for Medicare. This is an important consideration given
that it has been shown that having access to multiple health insurance programs leads
to different labor supply responses (Bradley et al., 2013). The results from this study
may differ from previous ones due to the fact that the entire population is eligible for
Medicare, in addition to any employer provided insurance they have. Finally, the results
from this study could be particularly informative for public policy in the future. The
increased economic pressures that stem from an ever aging population can be alleviated
by knowing how to stimulate the labor market activity of the elderly. According to the
Congressional Budget Office, the aging of the population is expected to account for 55%
of the projected growth in federal spending on Social Security and the major health
care programs as a share of GDP through 2039 (Congressional Budget Office, 2014). If
cancer is causing labor market exits, it will help policymakers to know whether these exits
are being driven by cancer related morbidity, changes in labor-leisure preferences, or by
health insurance status. From the point of view of cancer survivors, returning to work
may relieve any financial strain associated with illness and improve both their physical
and mental health.
1While these numbers are for the labor force as a whole they are very similar when broken down by
gender.
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This paper contributes to the literature in numerous ways. Firstly, it exploits the
fact that age is the biggest cancer risk factor. Within this high risk group all other risk
factors appear to have a negligible relationship with future cancer diagnosis. With data
from the Health and Retirement Study I demonstrate this by showing that the cancer
and non-cancer respondents look identical across multiple dimensions. This provides
appropriate justification for the assumptions behind the econometric analysis. Secondly,
I find that males, who are employed at the time of cancer diagnosis, work 3 hours fewer
per week in the period after diagnosis when compared to their non-cancer counterparts.
This reduction is driven by changes at the extensive margin. Respondents diagnosed with
cancer are 10 percentage points more likely to leave the labor market than non-cancer
respondents. I find no evidence of any reduction at the intensive margin. While these
estimates are of the same magnitude as estimates for younger survivors it is important
to remember that those who work past the age of 65 are a highly selected sample. If
the general population had been made to work past the age of 65 due to increases in
the retirement age then the estimates would likely be much larger. This is an important
consideration for policy makers due to the increasing retirement age. Thirdly, I find
that the presence of employer provided health insurance (EPHI) has no effect on the
probability of leaving the labor market. Since the previous literature on EPHI and job
mobility offers no clear pattern for male cancer survivors or men who are eligible for
Medicare, this provides more empirical evidence that male cancer survivors with EPHI
are not job-locked once they are eligible for Medicare. However, it does appear as if the
results are driven in part by the health of the respondents as I find that cancer has a
negative effect on both mental and physical health.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: A brief review of the related literature
is contained in Section 2; Section 3 contains information on the methods and the data
used in the analysis; The validity of the assumptions for the econometric models are
scrutinized in Section 4; In Section 5, I present the main results of the analysis; Section
6 examines the mechanisms by which the respondents reduce their labor supply; Section
7 discusses the implications of the results and Section 8 concludes.
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2 Related literature
While I am not aware of any other studies which explicitly examine the effect of cancer on
male labor supply for this age group, there are papers which have addressed this question
at other ages. In the US, Coile (2004) shows that married men (between 50 and 69
years of age) diagnosed with cancer are 8 percentage points more likely to leave the labor
market than workers without cancer. Coile (2004) also uses HRS data to examine the
effect of health shocks on labor supply but my paper differs in a number of substantive
ways. Firstly, I exclusively focus my analysis on workers over the age of 65 while workers
over the age of 65 in Coile (2004) are most likely a small group given that the mean age
of males is 60. Secondly, Coile uses data from waves 1 - 6 of the HRS while I use data
from waves 1 - 11. Coile includes respondents who have reported previous conditions of
severe illnesses (such as cancer) while these people are excluded from my analysis. Coile
also uses linear probability models while I augment my analysis with propensity score
matching and rigorous checks of the conditional independence and overlap assumptions.
Finally, Coile groups together all health shocks while I focus specifically on cancer, for
reasons justified in the Introduction. In fact, the result quoted above is the only cancer
specific result reported in the entire paper as it is from a specification check of a main
result.
Datta Gupta et al. (2015) shows that older men (between 55 and 64 years of age)
diagnosed with cancer are 9.8 percentage points more likely to not work than non-cancer
survivors two years after diagnosis. Bradley et al. (2005) and Bradley et al. (2007) show
that older men (with a mean age of 56) who have been diagnosed with prostate cancer
are 10 percentage points less likely to work in the 6 months following prostate cancer
diagnosis than healthy controls. Looking at longer term outcomes, Short et al. (2008)
show that, between two to six years after diagnosis, there is no significant difference
in employment for older male (between 55 and 65 years of age) cancer survivors versus
healthy workers, though they are less likely to work full-time and they work fewer hours
compared to control workers. The longer term impact for younger workers (with a mean
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age of 45) is similar, with Moran et al. (2011) showing that male survivors are less likely
to work, less likely to work full-time, and work fewer hours than controls.
There have also been several studies which have examined the effect of cancer on labor
supply around the world2. Evidence from Canada (Jeon, 2017), Denmark (Datta Gupta
et al., 2015; Heinesen and Kolodziejczyk, 2013; Kolodziejczyk and Heinesen, 2016), Finland
(Taskila-Brandt et al., 2004), Norway (Torp et al., 2013), the UK (Candon, 2015), and a
collection of 16 European countries (Trevisan and Zantomio, 2016), all show that cancer
has a negative effect on labor supply over various time horizons.
In this group, the most similar paper to this one is Candon (2015), though there are
still a number of sizable differences between the papers. With regards to the populations
of interest, the major difference between these two studies is that all of the respondents
in this paper are at least 65 years of age whereas only 4% of the sample in Candon (2015)
is at least 65. As mentioned earlier, there is no reason to believe that the labor supply
response of those below the traditional age of retirement would be the same as those
who are above it. With regards to the location, Candon (2015) is set in the UK which
has both a markedly different labor market and a markedly different healthcare market
compared to the US. This means that, even if the age groups were comparable, the results
from one setting cannot be generalized to the other. This also allows me to examine the
role that health insurance status plays in the labor supply decision, something not done
in Candon (2015) but something which is extremely important in US labor markets,
as the large literature on this topic demonstrates (Madrian (1994), Buchmueller and
Valletta (1996), and Kapur (1998)). Also, the aim of Candon (2015) was to determine
how long the negative labor supply shock from cancer diagnosis lasted for, rather than a
comprehensive understanding of the mechanisms related to the labor supply reduction,
which is done here. Finally, Candon (2015) only examines the effect of cancer diagnosis
on total hours of work and probability of working, rather than whether the reductions
2There are other studies which have examined the effect of health shocks on labor supply in the US
such as McClellan (1998) and Smith (2005) and in Europe such as Garcia-Gomez and Lopez-Nicolas
(2006), Garcia-Gomez (2011), and Garcia-Gomez et al. (2013). These studies may include cancer shocks
but no specific cancer effects are reported.
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were taking place at the intensive or extensive margin. Again, this is something which is
done in this study.
With regards to the econometric methods, all of the papers mentioned here deal
with the endogeneity of cancer diagnosis by using some combination of controlling for
observable differences between groups, differencing away unobservables which are constant
over time, and using matching to construct comparable control groups. This is the
standard for the literature since there are no obvious discontinuities or instruments to
exploit with the data at hand. The methods used here are discussed in more detail in
the next section.
3 Methods and Data
3.1 Methods
In order to estimate the effect of cancer on labor supply I use a variety of simple two
period models in which the periods are referred to as period t − 1 and period t. The
first method involves trying to eliminate any unobserved heterogeneity which is constant
across both periods. While it is possible to control for many known cancer risk factors
such as smoking and alcohol consumption, the worry when estimating the effect of cancer
on labor supply is the presence of unobserved confounding variables which are correlated
with cancer status but also determine labor market outcomes. The estimator of the effect
of cancer on labor supply will be biased if such a variable is omitted from the model.
However, if such variables are constant between the two time periods then they can be
differenced out, even if they are unobserved. To do this, I create a first-difference (FD)
model. Consider the following model,
Yi,t = β0 + β1Di,t + δ0 + αi + ui,t, (1)
Yi,t−1 = β0 + β1Di,t−1 + αi + ui,t−1, (2)
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where Y represents employment outcomes, D is a binary variable representing cancer
status, α is time-invariant unobserved heterogeneity, δ is a period t indicator, and u is
the traditional idiosyncratic error. If we subtract Equation (2) from Equation (1) we get,
∆Yi = δ0 + β1∆Di + ∆ui. (3)
This allows the time-invariant unobservable variables that affect both cancer status and
employment outcomes to be differenced out. Because β1 represents the difference in
outcomes, where the outcomes are already in differences, an estimator of β1 is a difference-
in-differences estimator (Wooldridge, 2016). This equation can then be estimated via
OLS.
Other control variables are omitted from (3) in order to prevent any contamination in
their differences that would stem from cancer diagnosis in period t. A different method
that would allow for the inclusion of control variables to account for observable differences
between the cancer and non-cancer respondents is a lagged dependent variable (LDV)
model. Such a model could be represented as
Yi,t = β0 + β1Di,t + β2Yi,t−1 + γ′Xi,t−1 + ui,t, (4)
where X is a (k x 1) vector of additional control variables measured in period t−1. Again,
this model can then be estimated with OLS. In short, the identification of the effect
of cancer on labor market outcomes relies on either differencing out any unobservable
factors affecting both cancer and employment or controlling for pre-cancer observables.
As noted by Angrist and Pischke (2009), because the FD and LDV models rely on different
identifying assumptions, they have a useful bracketing property that provides upper and
lower bounds to the causal effect. Obtaining similar results using both models provides
a simple demonstration of the robustness of the results.
The final method focuses on finding a suitable counterfactual for the respondents
who are diagnosed with cancer. Many previous papers in this field have used matching or
propensity score methods to examine the causal effect of cancer on labor market outcomes.
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While these methods rely on the same assumptions as linear regression models to identify
causal effects they are less reliant on extrapolation across differing covariate distributions
and do not impose strong functional form restrictions (Imbens, 2015). Because it is a
common belief that the treated group and the control group are drawn from different
populations in nonexperimental studies, the average treatment effect on the treated
(ATT) is the parameter which has received the most attention in this literature, and
it is the parameter that the analysis will focus on.
Using notation from Heckman et al. (1997), the observed outcome for an individual,
Y , is a combination of their potential outcomes {Y (1), Y (0)} where the parentheses
denote the outcome when an individual receives the treatment (1) and does not receive
the treatment (0). If D is an indicator of whether the individual receives the treatment
(where D = 1 if the individual receives the treatment; D = 0 otherwise) this can be
expressed more succinctly as
Y = DY (1) + (1−D)Y (0). (5)
The conventional method of matching rests on two assumptions3. The first is that,
conditional on the control variables, X, the outcome for those who do not receive the
treatment and treatment assignment are independent. This is known as the conditional
independence assumption (CIA) and can be denoted as
Y (0) ⊥ D|X. (6)
The second assumption is that there is overlap between the treatment and control units
for all values of X. This prevents the case where receiving the treatment can be perfectly
predicted and can be denoted as
Pr(D = 1|X) < 1. (7)
3Because I am interested in the average treatment effect on the treated, and not the average treatment
effect, the weak versions of these assumptions can be used. The strong versions of these assumptions
would require having to justify Y (1), Y (0) ⊥ D|X and 0 < Pr(D = 1|X) < 1. For more on the difference
between the strong and weak versions please consult Caliendo and Kopeinig (2008).
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If these two conditions are met then there is no need to condition on treatment status.
This is known by many names such as ignorability, selection-on-observables, or exogeneity.
Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983) show that if treatment assignment is ignorable for the finest
level of balance, the covariates themselves, then it must also be ignorable for coarser
measures of balance such as the propensity score. The propensity score is defined by
p(x) ≡ Pr(D = 1|X). (8)
Conditioning on the propensity score, rather than the covariates themselves, reduces
the dimensionality problem. If these assumptions are satisfied, then the ATT can be
estimated as the difference in observed responses to the treatment indicator, conditional
on the propensity score, for those in the treated group,
E[E{Y (1)|p(X), D = 1} − E{Y (0)|p(X), D = 0}|D = 1] =
E[E{Y (1)− Y (0)|p(X)}|D = 1] = ATT
(9)
where the outer expectation is over the distribution of p(X) in the sub-population of
treated respondents.
If two periods of data are available, then the previous formula can be augmented to
include this information. The ATT then becomes,
E[E{Yt(1)− Yt(0)|p(Xt−1)}|Dt = 1] = ATT (10)
where Yt(1) and Yt(0) refer to the outcomes for individuals who receive and do not receive
the treatment in period t, Dt denotes cancer status in period t, and Xt−1 denotes control
variables measured in period t − 1. This means that I am only using pre-treatment
variables as part of the conditioning set, in order to ensure that they cannot have been
affected by the treatment. It is also possible to use lagged values of the outcome variable
as part of the conditioning set. In this case, all the variables used in X, whether lagged
outcome variables or other control variables, have been measured in period t− 1, before
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anyone is diagnosed with cancer. In Section 4, I present empirical evidence to support
the assumptions which are required to use these models.
3.2 Data
In order to obtain the requisite data on older workers with which to do this analysis, I use
data from the Health and Retirement Study (HRS)4. The HRS is a large, longitudinal data
set which contains information on the respondents’ health, wealth, employment, and other
demographic information. The first wave was collected in 1992 using a representative
sample of 51 to 61 year olds and, since then, it has been collected every two years. For
this analysis, I use the RAND version of the data set which has already been cleaned
and compiled for ease of use5. This data set contains the first 11 survey waves, spanning
the years 1992 to 2012. With regards to the cancer variable, a respondent is considered
as having cancer if they respond in the affirmative to the question indicating whether or
not a doctor “has ever told them that they have cancer or a malignant tumor of any kind
except skin cancer”. They do not have cancer if they respond in the negative. As with
any study which examines the impact that cancer has on labor supply, it is important
to observe the respondents’ pre-cancer behavior while they are in employment. To do
this, information on the respondents before and after they are diagnosed with cancer
is required. This means that information in two different time periods is required for
each observation. Regarding the HRS, having 11 waves of data allows me to observe 10
potential non-cancer to cancer transitions: wave 1 to wave 2, wave 2 to wave 3, . . . ,
wave 10 to wave 11.
4The Health and Retirement Study (2015) is sponsored by the National Institute on Aging (grant
number NIA U01AG009740) and is conducted by the University of Michigan.
5Due to it’s survey design the HRS oversamples Black and Hispanic respondents and weights are
provided for use in data analysis to account for this. The main reason that the weights are often used
is to obtain the correct descriptive statistics of the target population. However, the issue of whether to
use them when estimating causal effects is more nuanced. Solon et al. (2015) outline some cases where
weighting may do more harm than good, particularly if the oversampling is done exogenously rather than
endogenously. They recommend in cases like this to present both the unweighted and weighted results
as the contrast can serve as a useful diagnostic against a misspecified model or misunderstanding of the
sampling process. In this case, the unweighted results and weighted results were so similar that I decided
to just use the unweighted results. The weighted results are available in Table A7 of the Appendix.
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Four main restrictions are placed on the overall data set. The respondents must be
working in period t− 1 so we can observe the effect of cancer on employment; they must
be at least 65 years of age in period t − 1 as this is the age group that the analysis will
focus on; the respondents must all be men as fewer women work past the age of 65; and
they cannot be diagnosed with cancer in period t − 1, or at any time in the past, so we
can observe their pre-cancer behavior. This means that respondents are removed if they
answer “Yes” to the cancer question listed above in period t− 16. This means that any
non-cancer to cancer transition is unique, though respondents may appear multiple times
with regards to their non-cancer work behavior. Respondents are categorized as working
if they are working full-time, part-time, or are part-retired. They are categorized as not
working if they are unemployed, retired, disabled, or not in the labor force. Some other
minor restrictions are also placed on the data7. Imposing these restrictions leaves a final
sample of 5,602 person-wave observations, of which, 238 will be diagnosed with cancer in
period t. Of the 5,602 observations, 2,436 are unique respondents8. As noted by Bertrand
et al. (2004), the serial correlation from using multiple waves of information on the same
respondents can severely understate the standard errors of the estimators. However, they
recommend aggregating the data into two simple before and after time periods, which is
done here, in order to help mitigate the problem. Another way to deal with the serial
correlation is to follow a similar two period analysis by Finkelstein (2004) and cluster the
standard errors at the individual level. This is done for the linear regression models.
In addition to using the employment and cancer information, I also use information
on pre-diagnosis variables that are measured in period t− 1. This includes demographic
6There are two potential drawbacks to the way that the HRS asks the cancer question which should
be highlighted here. The first is that respondents with a past diagnosis who are now cancer free are
eliminated because of this past diagnosis. So respondents who are cancer free in period t − 1 will be
removed if they had cancer at some point earlier in their lives. This is why the sample I focus on is
respondents who have never had cancer, rather than simply respondents who do not have cancer in
period t− 1. The second is that I can’t distinguish between a single cancer diagnosis occurring between
period t − 1 and t or multiple diagnoses. So a respondent may be diagnosed with two cancers but it
will be treated the same as a respondent diagnosed with one form of cancer. However, including the
respondents with previous diagnoses has no effect on the overall results (see Table A6).
7These restrictions, and the number of observation lost by imposing them, are presented in Table A3.
8While it is possible for a respondent to appear more than once with regards to their non-cancer
work status, each of the 238 cancer cases represents a unique individual. This is because respondents
are removed from the analysis if they have been previously diagnosed with cancer.
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information such as age, whether the respondent is non-white, has some or a full college
education, or is married. The behavioral cancer risk factors, as documented by Danaei
et al. (2005), that are taken into account are whether the respondent is in poor health, has
ever smoked, currently smokes, ever drinks any alcohol, and if they are obese9. Regarding
their employment situation, I include variables indicating whether they have a working
spouse, are self-employed, and their hours of work per week. I also control for their
earnings, household income, income from a pension or annuity, and income from Social
Security. These variables are all transformed using the inverse hyperbolic sine (IHS)
transformation10. This transformation is preferred to the logarithmic transformation
since it behaves like the logarithmic function for positive values but does not exclude
zero or negative values. Finally, dummy variables for HRS wave and census division are
also included. All the variables are binary except for age, the income variables, and hours
of work. Information on whether or not the respondents have employer provided health
insurance is also available. However it is not included in the main analysis due to the
fact that there were a large number of missing observations. Nevertheless, analyses which
include this variable are presented in Table 7 as part of subgroup analyses. These results
are largely similar to the main results.
4 Ignorability
4.1 Overlap
Using different econometric models to identify the effect of cancer on labor supply means
that different assumptions are required to be justified. The FD model relies on the change
in cancer status being uncorrelated with changes in the error term while the LDV and
PSM models rely on the unconfoundedness (conditional independence) assumption in
Equation (6). The PSM model also relies on the overlap assumption in Equation (7).
9Poor health is defined as being in poor or fair health as opposed to good, very good or excellent in
a self-reported health measure.
10The transformation of wealth, W , is w = ln (W +
√
(W 2 + 1)). For more on this transformation see
Pence (2006). The results do not change when the natural log is used as the wealth transformation, even
with the reduced sample size (see Table A8).
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Therefore, I spend this section examining the overlap assumption, the unconfoundedness
assumption, and the trends of the respondents’ over time. The first assumption, whether
there is sufficient overlap in the covariate distributions, is relatively straightforward to
test. One way to do this is to compare the means of these covariates between groups.
The descriptive statistics for both the cancer and non-cancer groups are presented in
Table 1, along with t tests for the equality of their means. Regarding the largest
differences, the cancer group is about 5 percentage points less likely to drink alcohol
and about 4 percentage points less likely to have ever smoked. The only differences
which are statistically significant at conventional levels are the alcohol difference and the
difference in pension income. In terms of demographic characteristics, cancer risk factors,
employment related characteristics, and earnings, the groups appear balanced. In the final
column, I present the normalized differences between the groups which provides a scale
and sample size free way of assessing overlap (Imbens, 2015). Again, a similar pattern
emerges, the variables with the largest differences are the alcohol and pension variables.
Looking at the period t outcomes, there is a 10 percentage point difference between the
groups with regards to whether or not the respondents are working, which is significant
at the 1% level. The cancer group also works almost 3 hours a week fewer than the
non-cancer group. This difference is significant at the 5% level.
While it may be surprising to see no significant differences between the cancer and
non-cancer groups with regards to specific cancer risk factors, this is actually a common
epidemiological observation. Rothman and Poole (1988) noted that the association
between a disease and a single specific risk factor could be made stronger by examining
the relationship within a group where the effect of all other possible risk factors has been
eliminated. The relationship is made stronger because the other mechanisms of disease
development have been shut off and disease development can only take place through this
specific risk factor. Similarly, they also noted that this finding held in reverse. Strong
associations between risk factors and diseases became weak when analyzed in high risk
groups with many potential mechanisms of development. In this case, because age is
the single biggest risk factor in developing cancer, both smokers and non-smokers (and
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obese respondents versus non-obese respondents etc.) are very likely to get cancer anyway,
simply because of their age (American Society of Clinical Oncology, 2012; National Cancer
Institute, 2015). This then makes the relationship between cancer and its risk factors
appear weak. There are numerous explanations as to why old age is the most important
cancer risk factor. Historically, it has been posited that longevity allows cells to build up
enough mutations over time to form tumors (Cancer Research UK, 2016). More recently,
new research has also shown tissue changes which occur in old age can make cells more
susceptible to cancer and that DNA repair, which combats mutations, weakens in old age
(DeGregori, 2013; Li et al., 2017).
As a final inspection of the overlap assumption, I follow Trevisan and Zantomio (2016)
and graph the density of the propensity score for the cancer and non-cancer groups (more
information on the generation of the propensity score is given in Section 5.2). This allows
for a visual inspection of the overlap between the two groups and to see if matching can
help make the groups more comparable. In Figure 1 we can see that a simple comparison
of the two densities shows that the groups are already very similar, even before matching.
4.2 Unconfoundedness
The identification of the effect also relies on whether or not the CIA assumption can be
satisfied. While it is fundamentally impossible to test the CIA, steps can be taken to
assess whether or not it is plausible. One way to assess it would be to check what factors
help select respondents into the treatment by regressing the treatment variable on the
control variables. In this case, the coefficients reported give the effect of a particular
variable on future cancer diagnosis after the effect of all of the other control variables
have been partialled out. The results of this logistic regression are reported in column
(1) of Table 2. The results reported are average marginal effects. Again, the ability of
these variables to predict future diagnosis is weak. Even for the cancer risk factors, the
magnitude of the coefficients is rarely greater than 0.01. Due to the limited association
between the other variables and cancer diagnosis, the null hypothesis of a Wald test
for the joint insignificance of the variables cannot be rejected, meaning that there is no
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evidence that they jointly help explain future cancer diagnosis. I report the p-value for
the Wald test, rather than the Wald statistic, as it is easier to interpret.
With the lack of a relationship between cancer diagnosis and the control variables, it
may be tempting to say that the variables used in the analysis are simply poor measures
of the underlying variables. For example, it may be the case that the cancer group are
unhealthier than the non-cancer group but, because of the way the variable is measured
or the way the survey questions are asked, it does not show up in this analysis. I attempt
to address this issue in the remaining columns in Table 2. Here, I regress period t
diagnosis of high blood pressure, heart problems, lung disease, arthritis, and diabetes on
the same period t−1 variables. The questions in the HRS that ask the respondents about
these health conditions are worded the same as the question that asks the respondents
about their cancer status. It is apparent that, even after controlling for the fact that
the respondents may have been diagnosed with this condition in period t − 1 or earlier,
all of the known risk factors (except for whether the respondents drink alcohol) are
statistically significant in determining these diseases. Since these variables help explain
variation in future diagnoses of other diseases, it supports the idea that the covariates
are in fact balanced between the cancer and non-cancer groups, rather than the idea that
these variables are simply coarse measures of underlying variables. While the comparison
across health conditions isn’t perfect, since people with previous cancer diagnosis are
removed in the Table 1 analysis, similar results can be found for these other health
conditions when restricting the sample to those respondents with no previous record of
the condition.
4.3 Trends
Finally, in order to justify the use of the FD model, I exploit the panel nature of HRS and
compare the past labor market outcomes and health outcomes of both sets of respondents.
If the outcomes are similar in the lead up to cancer diagnosis then we can be confident
that any difference found after diagnosis is due to cancer. The two outcomes I follow are
the weekly hours of work of the respondents and the proportion of respondents reporting
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themselves in poor health. A t test for the equality of their means is tested in each period.
It is apparent in both Figures 2 and 3 that in the three periods before cancer diagnosis
there is no difference in either outcome across groups. The only statistically significant
difference between the two groups arises in the period after diagnosis. Taken all together,
this evidence supports the plausibility of the ignorability assumptions and the use of the
different models.
5 Results
5.1 Linear regression models
I begin by estimating a simple regression of the hours of work in period t on cancer status
in period t. The results are presented in Panel A of Table 3. Cancer diagnosis leads to a
3.2 hour reduction in the number of hours worked per week. When the FD model in (3)
is estimated the results show that cancer diagnosis leads to a 3.3 hour reduction in hours
of work. No observations are lost when using the FD model since one of the restrictions
placed on the respondents is that they must be working in period t−1. HRS wave dummy
variables are also included in the FD model to capture any secular changes in hours of
work. The LDV model from (4) is estimated with and without the other pre-diagnosis
covariates. In both cases, cancer reduces hours of work by approximately 3.2 hours per
week. Given the lack of correlation between cancer status and the other covariates it
is not surprising to see similar estimates across different specifications. All results are
statistically significant at the 1% level.
In order to get a more comprehensive understanding of the effect that cancer has on
labor market outcomes, I check whether the previous results are due to reductions at the
intensive margin or the extensive margin. This will tell us whether the respondents are
reducing their labor supply within employment or whether they simply stop working. I
begin with the extensive margin. Since the respondents may stop working in different
ways, I use two different variables to capture the negative effect that cancer may have.
The first variable is whether or not the respondent is working in period t. This variable
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is equal to 1 if they are working full-time, part-time, or are part-retired and equal to 0
if the respondent is retired, unemployed, disabled, or not in the labor force. The second
variable is whether or not the respondent is in the labor force. This variable is equal to
1 if the respondent is working full-time, part-time, part-retired, or unemployed and 0 if
they are retired, disabled, or not in the labor force. Because all of the respondents are
working in period t− 1 the FD and LDV models are not appropriate for these outcomes.
Instead, I simply run pooled OLS with and without the control variables (which include
period t − 1 hours of work). In this case the identifying assumption is the same as the
one which will be used in the PSM section: conditional on observable characteristics in
period t − 1, cancer diagnosis in period t is assumed to be exogenous. The results of
this analysis are presented in Panel B. Cancer leads to an approximate 10 percentage
point decrease in the probability of working and an 11 percentage point decrease in the
probability of being in the labor force. Results are significant at the 1% level. Because
the number of respondents who are unemployed in period t is so small, respondents who
are not working will be referred to as out of the labor force when discussing the remaining
results.
I now check the intensive margin and estimate the same four models as in Panel A,
but with the added restriction that all the respondents must be employed in period t.
The results are presented in Panel C. In no model is the effect of cancer on the hours of
work of the respondents who are employed statistically significant. The respondents who
do return appear to work the same number of hours as those respondents who have not
been diagnosed with cancer. Together with the results from Panel B, this suggests that
the results presented in Panel A are being driven by reductions at the extensive margin,
rather than the intensive margin11.
5.2 Propensity score matching
I now use PSM to examine the effect of cancer diagnosis on employment outcomes. The
specific matching algorithm I use is kernel matching. This involves using a weighted
11I also estimate similar results with other panel data methods such as random effects and fixed effects.
For more information see Tables A1 and A2 of the Appendix.
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average of the entire control group to generate a counterfactual for each treatment
observation. While many different matching algorithms exist, kernel matching has been
shown to work well in situations where there are many control observations per treatment
observation and the propensity score distributions are well behaved (Frolich, 2004)12. For
a more detailed review of this, and other matching algorithms, see Caliendo and Kopeinig
(2008). I use a Gaussian kernel and, to select the bandwidth, I follow Heckman et al.
(1998) and use a rule of thumb. In this case, the rule of thumb is defined as
bandwidth ≈ 0.9An− 15 , (11)
where A = min{sample standard deviation, sample interquartile range/1.34} and n is
the number of observations in the control group (Sheather, 2004). The rule of thumb
above suggests a bandwidth of 0.003. I also estimate the effect using half and double
this bandwidth to test how sensitive the results are to this specification. To generate the
propensity score, I follow Dehejia and Wahba (1999, 2002) and use a logit model where the
covariates from Table 2 are entered linearly along with dummy variables for HRS waves
and census divisions. A balancing test confirms that the covariates are evenly distributed
across both groups within different strata of the estimated propensity score13. As was
shown in Figure 1 previously, the distribution of the propensity score looks similar for
both the cancer and non-cancer groups so the results from the matching process should
give similar results to those in Table 3.
The results of the PSM are presented in Table 4. Panel A shows that cancer diagnosis
leads to an approximate 3.3 hour reduction in the number of hours worked per week for
each of the three different bandwidths. Results are significant at the 1% level. In Panel
B, I check the extensive margin and find that cancer diagnosis leads to an approximate 10
percentage point decrease in the probability of working. Results are again significant at
the 1% level. Finally, I turn to the intensive margin in Panel C. In no model is the effect
12I also estimate the results with methods which use the propensity score in different ways. These
methods provide almost identical estimates. For more information see Tables A4 and A5 of the Appendix.
13To implement these methods, I use the ATT commands developed by (Becker and Ichino, 2002) for
Stata.
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of cancer on the hours of work of those who are employed statistically significant. In
addition, the coefficients are very close to zero. The respondents who do return work the
same number of hours as those respondents who have not been diagnosed with cancer.
As predicted, the results from PSM perfectly mirror the results from the other two period
models presented in Table 3.
5.3 Sensitivity
In this scenario, I hypothesize the presence of an unobserved binary confounding variable,
U , whose exclusion results in selection bias. This means that assignment to treatment is
not independent given X, but it is independent once U is taken into account,
Pr(D|Y (1), Y (0), X) 6= Pr(D|X), (12)
Pr(D|Y (1), Y (0), X, U) = Pr(D|X,U). (13)
If the omission of the variable U does result in selection bias then it must be the case that
U fulfills the following two conditions. The first condition is that U selects respondents
into the treatment. This means that a respondent with the confounding variable is more
likely to be in the treatment group. The second is that U leads to worse labor market
outcomes for those respondents who are not in the treatment group. This means that, in
the non-treatment group, the respondents with the confounding variable are more likely
to have worse labor market outcomes.
If we let




pij · Pr(Y = j|D = i), (15)
with i, j ∈ {0, 1}, then these two conditions can be expressed more precisely as the
following two equations:
s = p1. − p0. > 0, (16)
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d = p01 − p00 < 0. (17)
Equation (16) states that the probability of having the confounder given you are in the
treated group is greater than the probability of having the confounder given you are in the
untreated group. Equation (17) states that the probability of having the confounder given
you have a negative work outcome is greater than the probability of having the confounder
given you have a positive work outcome, conditional on being in the untreated group.
The idea behind this model is that, if this confounder is the true cause of the treatment
effect, it needs to be the case that we are mistaking the confounder for the treatment
variable (s > 0) and that the confounder has it’s own negative effect on outcomes that
is separate from the treatment (d < 0). For a more mathematically rigorous explanation
of this model, and the Stata commands to implement it, readers should consult both
Ichino et al. (2008) and Nannicini (2007)14. The work outcome that I choose to focus on
in this section is the probability of working given that cancer has been shown to have
a large negative effect on the extensive margin rather than the intensive margin. Since
the results in the previous section did not vary with different bandwidths I restrict my
analysis to the 0.003 bandwidth.
A potential candidate for this unobserved confounder could be a hazardous working
environment which simultaneously makes workers more likely to get cancer (s > 0) and
more likely to stop working even if they don’t get cancer (d < 0). If we imagine that this
hazardous working environment is the confounder, we can generate this selection bias
with just the four pij parameters that it would produce from Equation (14) if it was U .
A new variable, which is characterized by these four pij parameters, is then added to the
matching process and a new ATT is calculated. This is done 200 times and an average
of the ATTs is taken. This test is similar to that of Altonji et al. (2005) but with the
benefit of not having to rely on a specific model to characterize the bias.
In the top panel of Table 5, I hypothesize that the unobserved confounder takes
on a distribution similar to some of the binary variables already in the model. For
14The SENSATT command builds on the existing ATT commands developed by Becker and Ichino
(2002).
22
example, if the omitted variable were to take on a distribution similar to the binary
variable indicating whether the respondent is a drinker, then its inclusion in the model
would result in the kernel matching estimate of the negative effect of cancer on working
decreasing in magnitude from 10.2 percentage points to 10 percentage points, a negligible
change. In fact, this is the largest change that happens when the omitted variable takes
on a distribution like one of the binary variables already in the model. Again, this is to
be expected given the weak relationship between these variables and cancer diagnosis.
I also vary the values of both d and s manually and examine how the matching
estimate changes in response. This allows me to demonstrate how strong both of the
effects would have to be in order to drive the estimate to zero. In order to reduce the
dimensionality of the problem in the search for the “killer” confounders, I need a system
of four equations to identify the four pij parameters that characterize the confounder’s
distribution. To do this, I fix at pre-determined values the parameters Pr(U = 1) (the
prevalence of the confounder in the whole sample) and p11 − p10 (the difference in the
probability of having the confounder given that you have a positive labor market outcome
in the presence of the treatment and the probability of having the confounder given that
you have a negative labor market outcome in the presence of the treatment). The values
they are fixed at are
Pr(U = 1) = p11 · Pr(Y = 1|D = 1) · Pr(D = 1) +
p10 · Pr(Y = 0|D = 1) · Pr(D = 1) +
p01 · Pr(Y = 1|D = 0) · Pr(D = 0) +
p00 · Pr(Y = 0|D = 0) · Pr(D = 0) = 0.2.
(18)
p11 − p10 = 0. (19)
These values indicate that the prevalence of the confounder in the sample is 20%, while
the effect of the confounder on the treated outcome is normalized to zero. Ichino et al.
(2008) notes that these parameters can be held constant at fixed values as they are not
expected to threaten the validity of the original estimates. In the case of Equation (18),
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it is not the prevalence of the confounding variable in the sample that is the issue but
the fact that it causes selection into the treatment variable. We have already represented
this selection problem as s. The value of 20% is chosen simply because the prevalence
of the other health conditions in Table 1 is between 10 - 60%. Similarly, with regards
to Equation (19), selection bias does not stem from the fact that the confounder affects
the work outcomes of those in the treatment group so we have normalized this effect to
be zero. In order for the confounder to be the true cause of the effect it needs to have
it’s own negative effect on the outcome, separate from the treatment. We have already
represented this outcome problem as d. So while the values chosen for the parameters
in Equation (18) and Equation (19) are somewhat arbitrary, the important thing is that
they are held constant at fixed, known values, in order to simulate values of d and s.
Equation (18) and Equation (19) are combined with Equation (16) and Equation (17) to
solve for the four pij parameters when certain numerical values are entered for d and s.
In the second panel of Table 5, the values of both d and s that are required to produce
substantial changes in the estimate are far greater than any variable already in the model.
This means that there would have to be an unobserved variable which strongly makes
the respondents more likely to get cancer and less likely to work if they did not have
cancer. Given the major cancer risk factors and other important determinants of work
are already included in the model, this seems unlikely. Taken altogether, the analyses
presented in Sections 4 and 5 robustly demonstrate that cancer has a negative effect on
the labor supply of men over the age of 65.
6 Mechanisms
6.1 Health mechanism
The next step in the analysis is to find out why the respondents who are diagnosed
with cancer are reducing their labor supply. The most obvious mechanism would be
that cancer affects the respondents’ health and that this decrease in health causes the
reduction. In order to examine whether it is the change in the health of the respondents
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which is driving the reduction in labor supply I replace the outcome variable with a
variety of health variables and estimate the effect using the same four models that were
used in Table 3.
In particular, I focus on binary outcomes indicating whether the respondents are in
poor health and whether health is limiting their work. The results in Table 6 show that
cancer increases the probability of reporting these negative health outcomes by between
14 - 16 percentage points. I also examine whether it is mental health or physical health
which is affected. These results should be interpreted with care as the original outcome
variables are not binary. For mental health, I use a Center for Epidemiologic Studies
Depression scale (CES-D) which is a 9-point scale with each point corresponding to a
negative response to one of these eight CES-D questions: whether the respondent feels
depressed; feels everything is an effort; has restless sleep; feels sad; feels lonely; cannot get
going; doesn’t feel happy; and doesn’t enjoy life. Cancer diagnosis leads to an increase
of between 0.2 to 0.3 of one of these points. For physical health, I use a summary of the
Activities of Daily Living (ADL) variables. This variable uses a 4-point scale which is
the sum of three binary variables indicating whether the respondent has trouble bathing,
eating, and dressing. Cancer diagnosis leads to an increase of 0.08 of one of these points.
Overall, the results show that cancer has a negative effect on general, mental, and physical
health with each result in columns (2), (3), and (4) significant at the 5% level.
Previous research has cautioned against interpreting self-reported health problems in
this scenario due to the fear that people may exaggerate illness to explain labor force
absence (Anderson and Burkhauser, 1985; Stern, 1989; Bound, 1991). However, this is
unlikely to be the case here since a) the workers do not need to exaggerate illness to
gain access to Social Security or Medicare at this age and b) they do not face societal
pressures to justify leaving the labor force in the way a younger worker would.
6.2 Insurance mechanism
An important factor which may affect the labor supply of workers is health insurance.
There already exists a large literature which examines the effect of health on worker
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mobility in the presence of employer provided health insurance (EPHI) (see Madrian
(1994), Buchmueller and Valletta (1996), and Kapur (1998) for some of the original
papers in this area). With regards to cancer, more recent studies have found evidence
of job-lock for women (Bradley et al., 2006; Tunceli et al., 2009; Bradley et al., 2013)
though the evidence for men is mixed (Tunceli et al., 2009; Bradley et al., 2012). There
is the potential for this to be mitigated in this sample since the respondents are all
eligible for Medicare and are not relying on continuous employment to maintain their
health insurance. However, previous studies which have examined the effect of Medicare
eligibility on worker mobility have also found mixed results (Fairlie et al., 2011, 2016).
Since the previous literature offers no clear pattern for male cancer survivors and men
who are eligible for Medicare, the question of whether we expect the effect to differ based
on EPHI status will have to be answered empirically.
There is a variable in the HRS data set which indicates EPHI status but this was
not used in the main analysis due to a large number of missing observations. In Table
7, I present the results of extra analyses using this EPHI variable. Column (1) gives
the results when EPHI status in period t− 1 is included as an extra control in the LDV
model. The new effects calculated are almost identical to the ones in Table 3. The effects
are slightly smaller when the sample is restricted to those respondents who did not have
EPHI in period t−1 and slightly larger when the sample is restricted to those with EPHI
in period t− 1. While the difference between these coefficients may seem large they are
not statistically different from zero. For this sample of workers, it appears as if their
mobility is not affected by EPHI.
6.3 Hours mechanism
A final way in which the labor supply decision of the respondents may be affected is by
the amount of hours they are already working before they are diagnosed. Respondents
who work relatively few hours per week may feel a weaker attachment to labor market
and may decide to reduce their labor supply at a greater rate in the event of illness. In
Table 8, I run the LDV model separately for respondents who work fewer than 30 hours
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per week and respondents who work at least 30 hours per week. While the results in
Panel A show no difference between the models, the difference in the coefficients in Panel
B is quite large. It shows that respondents diagnosed with cancer who were working
fewer than 30 hours per week are almost 16 percentage points less likely to be working
compared to their non-cancer counterparts. However, the coefficient for those who work
at least 30 hours is only 5 percentage points. The difference between these coefficients
is also large enough that it is statistically different from zero. For those who do return
to work no difference is found, as has been the case throughout the analysis. Similar
results are found if the workers are classified as full-time versus not full-time instead of
at least 30 hours per week versus fewer than 30 hours per week. It may be tempting
to say that the respondents working fewer hours to begin with may have been sicker or
more susceptible to disease but this does not appear to be the case. In the Appendix,
Table A9 gives some descriptive statistics for both of the groups. The two groups are
very well balanced across the demographic and health variables that we saw in Table 1.
The only major difference appears to be that those who were working fewer than 30 hours
are slightly older than the other group. While this analysis does not say anything about
cancer diagnoses changing the respondents’ labor-leisure preferences, it does suggest that
those who had a greater preference for leisure over labor to begin with were the ones who
had the greatest labor supply response.
6.4 Propensity score matching results
Table 9 presents PSM estimates for all of the LDV and Pooled OLS estimates calculated
in Section 6. As was the case with the results in Section 5, the PSM estimates generally
give the same results as the linear regressions.
7 Discussion
How do these results compare with the results from other studies in the field? With
regards to studies on slightly younger survivors (Bradley et al., 2005; Short et al., 2008;
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Datta Gupta et al., 2015) the results are very similar. However, care should be taken to
not generalize these results to other groups, particularly future cohorts of workers who
will work past the age of 65. Those who are working past the age of 65 in this data set
are a highly selected sample: they are likely to be healthier than the people who have
already left the labor market at this age, or have jobs that require less physical exertion.
Given these differences it is also likely that their labor supply response to this shock will
be different to the people who have already left the market. For example, we may expect
that a worker with an average level of health may retire after a cancer diagnosis, whereas
a worker who is in excellent health may still return to work after a cancer diagnosis.
However, in the future, the people who would have left the market at 65 will need to
remain in order to receive full Social Security benefits. Estimating this model for workers
who need to work past the age of 65 for their full retirement benefits would likely give
results which are larger in magnitude since the sample would now include workers who
are not as healthy, who are in more physical jobs, or who are not as attached to their
jobs as the workers in this sample. Nevertheless, policy makers can use this result as a
lower bound of the true effect for future cohorts.
If the labor supply reductions are being driven by changes in the health of the
respondents, as the results suggest, then it has important implications for future policy
decisions. For example, flexible working conditions such as shorter work days or the ability
to work from home are likely to benefit both workers who are physically impaired, as well
as workers who have had their labor-leisure preferences changed. However, more targeted
approaches, such as helping the workers find rehabilitative services from an external
provider, would only be of benefit to workers whose health had suffered. Neumark et al.
(2015) recently showed that working women who had been diagnosed with breast cancer
were more likely to stay working if their employer provided such services. Given that
the results in this study are similar in magnitude to those from other studies on younger
cohorts, such as Bradley et al. (2005) and Datta Gupta et al. (2015), policies which have
improved the labor market activity of these survivors may be able to help older cohorts
too.
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This paper also contains some limitations. The first is that, as with any study of
health shocks on employment, I can only observe the effect of cancer on labor supply for
those who are healthy enough to stay in the survey. Therefore, attrition is likely to be
an issue. It is easy to imagine that the respondents who have been severely affected by
cancer would be more likely to leave the survey than the respondents who have only been
mildly affected. This again raises the issue of how representative the remaining sample is
of employed men who work past the age of 65. What are the implications of these attriters
for the results and future policies? With regards to the results we can again think of these
estimates as lower bounds of the true effects. If the attriters had been included in the
analysis then the effect of cancer on labor supply would likely be greater in magnitude,
not closer to zero. This is because we are not including the people who would have had
the biggest reduction in labor supply. So while attrition is a limitation of this paper,
solving the attrition problem would reinforce the results rather than undermine them.
We have a similar situation regarding policy: any remedial programs arising from these
results are likely only to be able to help respondents who are healthy enough to take
advantage of them and could be of less help to people who are so sick that they drop out
of the survey.
The second is that I am unable to explicitly test whether the reduction in labor supply
is driven by physical impairment, a change in labor-leisure preferences, or both. However,
given that I do find a negative effect on physical and mental health it does suggest at least
some of the effect is driven by health impairment. This is in line with recent research from
Trevisan and Zantomio (2016) who find that physical impairment is a major driver of
labor market exits for men. Also, it should be stated that the results found here are short
term results, where workers must be within two years of diagnosis. If the respondents
were followed over a longer period of time, as in studies such as Moran et al. (2011) or
Short et al. (2008), then the effect of cancer on the labor supply of this age group may
be different. Finally, I do not have access to the type of cancer that the respondents are
diagnosed with so the results cannot be broken down by cancer subgroup. However, this
is not an uncommon limitation as studies such as Datta Gupta et al. (2015), Moran et al.
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(2011), Short et al. (2008), and Trevisan and Zantomio (2016) also report the effect for all
cases pooled together. Despite these limitations, this paper contributes to the literature
by providing a comprehensive analysis of the effect of cancer on the labor supply of men
over the age of 65, including demonstrating that EPHI has no effect on the labor supply
reduction of these workers.
8 Conclusion
While previous research has documented the negative effect that cancer has on male labor
supply, no paper has examined this effect on those who work past the age of 65. Due to
the number of new cancer diagnoses within this age group every year, and the relevance of
this age group to public policy, addressing this question can provide valuable information
as both age and labor demographics shift dramatically. I contribute to this literature by
providing a robust analysis of the effect of cancer on male workers over the age of 65. I
find that respondents who are diagnosed with cancer work 3 hours fewer per week when
compared with workers who were not diagnosed with cancer. This reduction stems from
workers leaving the labor market. For the workers who continue to work, no difference is
observed between the cancer and non-cancer respondents. Cancer has a negative effect
on both the physical and mental health of the respondents. Finally, while the results
differ based on whether or not the respondents were working fewer than 30 hours per
week as opposed to at least 30 hours per week, the effect of cancer on labor supply does
not appear to differ by EPHI status. In the future, further research can help shed light
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Figure 3: Health comparison
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Tables
Table 1: Summary statistics








Age 69.85 3.66 69.54 3.68 1.30 0.09
Non-white 0.13 0.34 0.14 0.34 -0.15 -0.01
College 0.48 0.50 0.47 0.50 0.20 0.01
Married 0.88 0.32 0.87 0.34 0.77 0.05
Poor health 0.16 0.37 0.15 0.36 0.36 0.02
Smoker (ever) 0.64 0.48 0.68 0.47 -1.19 -0.08
Smoker (now) 0.13 0.33 0.11 0.32 0.65 0.04
Drink alcohol 0.55 0.50 0.60 0.49 -1.68 -0.11
Obese 0.25 0.43 0.25 0.43 -0.02 -0.00
Spouse working 0.37 0.48 0.36 0.48 0.47 0.03
Self-employed 0.39 0.49 0.39 0.49 -0.05 -0.00
Hours of work 30.18 15.73 30.11 16.23 0.07 0.00
IHS (earnings) 7.17 5.02 7.09 5.05 0.25 0.02
IHS (HH income) 11.87 0.81 11.79 0.87 1.33 0.09
IHS (pension) 4.08 5.02 3.53 4.84 1.72 0.11
IHS (SS) 8.80 3.45 8.78 3.48 0.06 0.00
Period t
Working 0.63 0.48 0.73 0.45 -3.39 -0.22
Hours of week 18.25 18.60 21.44 18.95 -2.55 -0.17
Observations 238 5,364
Note: Nor-diff - Normalized differences; IHS - Inverse hyperbolic sine; HH - Household.
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Table 2: Selection into diseases









Past diagnoses - 0.371*** 0.351*** 0.164*** 0.399*** 0.278***
- (0.016) (0.012) (0.014) (0.011) (0.021)
Age 0.001 0.000 0.003*** 0.001 0.002** -0.001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Non-white 0.000 0.005 -0.033*** -0.007 -0.003 0.010
(0.008) (0.009) (0.011) (0.006) (0.010) (0.007)
College -0.000 -0.009 0.004 -0.001 -0.004 0.001
(0.006) (0.007) (0.007) (0.004) (0.008) (0.006)
Married 0.005 -0.012 0.003 0.001 -0.007 0.004
(0.009) (0.009) (0.010) (0.006) (0.011) (0.007)
Poor health 0.003 0.007 0.037*** 0.014*** 0.031*** 0.002
(0.007) (0.010) (0.010) (0.005) (0.011) (0.007)
Smoker (ever) -0.007 0.021*** 0.003 0.018*** 0.005 0.003
(0.006) (0.007) (0.007) (0.006) (0.008) (0.005)
Smoker (now) 0.011 -0.024** -0.009 0.026*** -0.009 -0.007
(0.009) (0.011) (0.011) (0.005) (0.012) (0.009)
Drink alcohol -0.009* -0.005 -0.012* -0.000 0.003 -0.003
(0.006) (0.006) (0.007) (0.004) (0.008) (0.005)
Obese 0.001 0.021*** 0.008 0.007 0.022** 0.027***
(0.006) (0.008) (0.008) (0.004) (0.009) (0.005)
Spouse working 0.002 -0.013* 0.002 0.006 0.009 -0.008
(0.006) (0.007) (0.007) (0.004) (0.008) (0.006)
Self-employed -0.002 0.003 -0.002 -0.008 -0.005 -0.001
(0.007) (0.008) (0.009) (0.005) (0.009) (0.007)
Hours of work 0.000 0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000* 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
IHS (earnings) -0.000 -0.000 0.000 -0.001* 0.001 -0.000
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
IHS (HH income) 0.005 -0.000 -0.001 0.002 -0.007 -0.004
(0.004) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.005) (0.003)
IHS (pension) 0.001 -0.001 0.001 0.000 0.002*** 0.000
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001)
IHS (SS) -0.000 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.001 -0.001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
p-value 0.493 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Observations 5,602 5,373 5,477 5,506 5,328 5,498
Note: All models estimated by maximum likelihood. Clustered standard errors (by individual)
in parentheses. * Result significant at the 10% level. ** Result significant at the 5% level. ***
Result significant at the 1% level. The p-value is for the Wald test for the joint insignificance
of all the variables in the logistic regression. IHS - Inverse hyperbolic sine; HH - Household.
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Table 3: Linear models
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel A: Hours of work
Pooled FD LDV LDV
Cancer -3.196*** -3.298*** -3.240*** -3.176***
(1.233) (1.172) (1.084) (1.074)
Wave dummies No Yes No Yes
Region dummies No No No Yes
Period t− 1 controls No No No Yes
Observations 5,602 5,602 5,602 5,602
(5) (6) (7) (8)
Panel B: Working Panel C: In labor force
Pooled Pooled Pooled Pooled
Cancer -0.100*** -0.100*** -0.111*** -0.110***
(0.032) (0.031) (0.032) (0.031)
Wave dummies No Yes No Yes
Region dummies No Yes No Yes
Period t− 1 controls No Yes No Yes
Observations 5,602 5,602 5,602 5,602
(9) (10) (11) (12)
Panel D: Hours of work (if working)
Pooled FD LDV LDV
Cancer -0.368 -1.461 -1.094 -1.025
(1.277) (1.008) (0.931) (0.907)
Wave dummies No Yes No Yes
Region dummies No No No Yes
Period t− 1 controls No No No Yes
Observations 4,046 4,046 4,046 4,046
Note: All coefficients are from separate models. All models estimated by OLS. Clustered
standard errors (by individual) in parentheses. * Result significant at the 10% level. ** Result
significant at the 5% level. *** Result significant at the 1% level. FD - First-differences; LDV
- Lagged dependent variable.
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Table 4: Propensity score matching
(1) (2) (3)
Panel A: Hours of work
Bandwidth: 0.0015 Bandwidth: 0.003 Bandwidth: 0.006
Cancer -3.271*** -3.257*** -3.227***
(1.154) (1.146) (1.134)
Observations 5,602 5,602 5,602
Panel B: Working
Bandwidth: 0.0015 Bandwidth: 0.003 Bandwidth: 0.006
Cancer -0.102*** -0.102*** -0.102***
(0.032) (0.032) (0.031)
Observations 5,602 5,602 5,602
Panel C: Hours of work (if working)
Bandwidth: 0.0015 Bandwidth: 0.003 Bandwidth: 0.006
Cancer -0.299 -0.313 -0.328
(1.222) (1.202) (1.192)
Observations 4,046 4,046 4,046
Note: All coefficients are from separate models. Bootstrapped standard errors in parentheses.
* Result significant at the 10% level. ** Result significant at the 5% level. *** Result significant
at the 1% level.
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Table 5: Sensitivity of matching estimates to unobserved confounder
Original ‘Working’ estimate = -0.102
Panel A: ‘Calibrated’ confounder
Confounder like New estimate d s
Non-white -0.102 -0.03 -0.01
College -0.103 0.10 0.01
Married -0.102 0.02 0.01
Poor health -0.102 -0.05 0.01
Smoker (ever) -0.103 -0.05 -0.04
Smoker (now) -0.101 -0.04 0.02
Alcohol drinker -0.100 0.03 -0.05
Obese -0.102 -0.02 0.00
Panel B: ‘Killer’ confounder
Confounder like New estimate d s
Manually constructed -0.089 -0.10 0.10
Manually constructed -0.077 -0.10 0.20
Manually constructed -0.064 -0.10 0.30
Manually constructed -0.077 -0.20 0.10
Manually constructed -0.056 -0.20 0.20
Manually constructed -0.025 -0.20 0.30
Manually constructed -0.063 -0.30 0.10
Manually constructed -0.031 -0.30 0.20
Manually constructed 0.008 -0.30 0.30
Note: s = p1. − p0. > 0 - the probability of having the confounder given you are in the treated
group is greater than the probability of having the confounder given you are in the untreated
group; d = p01 − p00 < 0 - the probability of having the confounder given you have a negative
work outcome is greater than the probability of having the confounder given you have a positive
work outcome, conditional on being in the untreated group.
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Table 6: Health mechanism
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel A: Poor health
Pooled FD LDV LDV
Cancer 0.168*** 0.155*** 0.164*** 0.164***
(0.031) (0.031) (0.029) (0.029)
Observations 5,601 5,601 5,601 5,601
Panel B: Health limits work
Pooled FD LDV LDV
Cancer 0.120*** 0.158*** 0.143*** 0.137***
(0.031) (0.032) (0.031) (0.030)
Observations 5,237 4,978 4,978 4,978
Panel C: CES-D
Pooled FD LDV LDV
Cancer 0.159 0.306*** 0.224** 0.219**
(0.110) (0.100) (0.097) (0.097)
Observations 5,076 4,842 4,842 4,842
Panel D: ADL
Pooled FD LDV LDV
Cancer 0.082** 0.086** 0.083*** 0.081**
(0.033) (0.034) (0.032) (0.032)
Observations 5,600 5,490 5,490 5,490
Wave dummies No Yes No Yes
Region dummies No No No Yes
Period t− 1 controls No No No Yes
Note: All coefficients are from separate models. All models estimated by OLS. Clustered
standard errors (by individual) in parentheses. * Result significant at the 10% level. ** Result
significant at the 5% level. *** Result significant at the 1% level. FD - First-differences; LDV -
Lagged dependent variable; CES-D - Center for Epidemiologic Studies Depression Scale; ADL
- Activities of Daily Living.
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Table 7: Insurance mechanism
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel A: Hours of work
LDV LDV LDV p-value for
(2) - (3) = 0
Cancer -3.066*** -2.854** -4.065** 0.5937
(1.132) (1.443) (1.771)
Observations 5,274 3,299 1,975 5,274
Panel B: Working
Pooled Pooled Pooled p-value for
(2) - (3) = 0
Cancer -0.100*** -0.093** -0.127** 0.6016
(0.032) (0.040) (0.054)
Observations 5,274 3,299 1,975 5,274
Panel C: Hours of work (if working)
LDV LDV LDV p-value for
(2) - (3) = 0
Cancer -0.705 -0.320 -1.758 0.4086
(0.947) (1.297) (1.180)
Observations 3,819 2,342 1,477 3,819
EPHIt−1 included Yes No No -
EPHIt−1 = 0 No Yes No -
EPHIt−1 = 1 No No Yes -
Wave dummies Yes Yes Yes -
Region dummies Yes Yes Yes -
Period t− 1 controls Yes Yes Yes -
Note: All coefficients are from separate models. All models estimated by OLS. Clustered
standard errors (by individual) in parentheses. * Result significant at the 10% level. ** Result
significant at the 5% level. *** Result significant at the 1% level. LDV - Lagged dependent
variable; EPHI - Employer Provided Health Insurance.
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Table 8: Hours mechanism
(1) (2) (3)
Panel A: Hours of work
LDV LDV p-value for
(1) - (2) = 0
Cancer -3.046** -3.379* 0.8739
(1.212) (1.732)
Observations 2,556 3,046 5,602
Panel B: Working
Pooled Pooled p-value for
(1) - (2) = 0
Cancer -0.157*** -0.054 0.0943*
(0.047) (0.041)
Observations 2,556 3,046 5,602
Panel C: Hours of work (if working)
LDV LDV p-value for
(1) - (2) = 0
Cancer -0.405 -1.565 0.5461
(1.587) (1.118)
Observations 1,729 2,317 4,046
Hourst−1 < 30 Yes No -
Hourst−1 ≥ 30 No Yes -
Wave dummies Yes Yes -
Region dummies Yes Yes -
Period t− 1 controls Yes Yes -
Note: All coefficients are from separate models. All models estimated by OLS. Clustered
standard errors (by individual) in parentheses. * Result significant at the 10% level. ** Result
significant at the 5% level. *** Result significant at the 1% level. LDV - Lagged dependent
variable.
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Table 9: Propensity score matching estimates for subsections
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel A: Table 6
Poor health Health limits
work
CES-D ADL
Cancer 0.165*** 0.136*** 0.220** 0.081***
(0.029) (0.032) (0.097) (0.031)
Panel B: Table 7
Hours of work Working Hours of work
(if working)
Cancer (EPHIt−1 included) -3.020*** -0.100*** -0.718
(1.079) (0.032) (1.106)
Cancer (EPHIt−1=0) -3.003** -0.095** 0.592
(1.348) (0.038) (1.691)
Cancer (EPHIt−1=1) -3.408 -0.116* -2.161
(2.106) (0.061) (1.984)
Panel C: Table 8
Hours of work Working Hours of work
(if working)
Cancer (Hourst−1 < 30) -3.240** -0.162*** -0.448
(1.375) (0.052) (1.778)
Cancer (Hourst−1 ≥ 30) -3.075 -0.046*** -1.464
(1.936) (0.045) (1.372)
Note: All coefficients are from separate models. Bootstrapped standard errors in parentheses.
* Result significant at the 10% level. ** Result significant at the 5% level. *** Result significant
at the 1% level.
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Table A1: LDV with random effects
(1) (2) (3)
Hours Working Hours (if working)
Cancer -3.338*** -0.109*** -1.074
(1.079) (0.031) (0.949)
Observations 5,602 5,602 4,046
Note: All models are estimated by OLS. Clustered standard errors in parentheses. All models
also include the control variables from Table 1, dummy variables for HRS waves, and census
regions. * Result significant at the 10% level. ** Result significant at the 5% level. *** Result
significant at the 1% level.
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Table A2: Fixed effects model
(1) (2) (3)
Hours Working Hours (if working)
Cancer -4.342*** -0.138*** -1.062
(1.186) (0.033) (1.026)
Observations 8,038 8,038 6,482
Note: Before estimating the fixed effects model it is important to remember that each
observation in the original sample requires two periods of information to construct it. Therefore,
each observation represents a two-wave transition which involves a respondent transitioning
from a non-cancer state to a cancer state, or remaining without cancer. This means that
for each unique respondent in the main sample, the first observation is lost by constructing
these two-wave transitions. In order to run the correct fixed effects model, I need to add this
first observation for each unique person back into the sample. Because there are 2,436 unique
respondents in the main sample that means adding 2,436 observations to the original sample of
5,602 observations for a total of 8,038. All models are estimated by OLS. Clustered standard
errors in parentheses. All models also include dummy variables for HRS waves. * Result
significant at the 10% level. ** Result significant at the 5% level. *** Result significant at the
1% level.
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Younger than 65 or older than 78 in period t− 1 60,853
Previous cancer diagnosis in period t− 1 (or before) 4,238
Not working in period t− 1 15,319
Reporting no hours when working (and vice versa) in either period 458
Working more than 80 hours a week in either period 63
Missing information for control variables in t− 1 327
Restricted sample 5,602
Note: Observations refers to person-wave observations (i.e one individual in the survey for
10 waves appears as 10 observations). While the final sample used is only a fraction of the
unrestricted sample, the overwhelming majority of observations excluded results from restricting
the data to the population of interest: working men who are over the age of 65 and who have
never been diagnosed with cancer before.
52
Table A4: Stratification matching
(1) (2) (3)
Hours Working Hours (if working)
Cancer -3.229*** -0.102*** -0.319
(1.133) (0.031) (1.198)
Observations 5,602 5,602 4,046
Note: All coefficients are from separate models. Three blocks are used for stratification.
Bootstrapped standard errors in parentheses. * Result significant at the 10% level. ** Result
significant at the 5% level. *** Result significant at the 1% level.
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Table A5: Inverse probability weighting
(1) (2) (3)
Hours Working Hours (if working)
Cancer -3.122*** -0.093*** -0.606
(1.175) (0.033) (1.298)
Observations 5,602 5,602 4,046
Note: All coefficients are from separate models. Bootstrapped standard errors in parentheses.
* Result significant at the 10% level. ** Result significant at the 5% level. *** Result significant
at the 1% level.
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Table A6: Including respondents with previous cancer diagnoses
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel A: Hours of work
Pooled FD LDV LDV
Cancer -2.932** -2.887** -2.897*** -2.810***
(1.194) (1.166) (1.074) (1.060)
Wave dummies No Yes No Yes
Region dummies No No No Yes
Period t− 1 controls No No No Yes
Observations 6,487 6,487 6,487 6,487
(5) (6) (7) (8)
Panel B: Working Panel C: In labor force
Pooled Pooled Pooled Pooled
Cancer -0.086*** -0.085*** -0.095*** -0.094***
(0.032) (0.031) (0.032) (0.031)
Wave dummies No Yes No Yes
Region dummies No Yes No Yes
Period t− 1 controls No Yes No Yes
Observations 6,487 6,487 6,487 6,487
(9) (10) (11) (12)
Panel D: Hours of work (if working)
Pooled FD LDV LDV
Cancer -0.602 -1.031 -0.882 -0.790
(1.226) (1.018) (0.936) (0.912)
Wave dummies No Yes No Yes
Region dummies No No No Yes
Period t− 1 controls No No No Yes
Observations 4,689 4,689 4,689 4,689
Note: All coefficients are from separate models. All models estimated by OLS. Clustered
standard errors (by individual) in parentheses. * Result significant at the 10% level. ** Result
significant at the 5% level. *** Result significant at the 1% level. FD - First-differences; LDV
- Lagged dependent variable.
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Table A7: Using HRS weights to account for over-represented populations
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel A: Hours of work
Pooled FD LDV LDV
Cancer -3.486** -4.197** -3.886** -3.872***
(1.490) (1.754) (1.523) (1.498)
Wave dummies No Yes No Yes
Region dummies No No No Yes
Period t− 1 controls No No No Yes
Observations 5,306 5,306 5,306 5,306
(5) (6) (7) (8)
Panel B: Working Panel C: In labor force
Pooled Pooled Pooled Pooled
Cancer -0.114*** -0.119*** -0.124*** -0.128***
(0.037) (0.037) (0.037) (0.037)
Wave dummies No Yes No Yes
Region dummies No Yes No Yes
Period t− 1 controls No Yes No Yes
Observations 5,306 5,306 5,306 5,306
(9) (10) (11) (12)
Panel D: Hours of work (if working)
Pooled FD LDV LDV
Cancer -0.168 -0.611 -0.477 -0.401
(1.503) (1.247) (1.172) (1.114)
Wave dummies No Yes No Yes
Region dummies No No No Yes
Period t− 1 controls No No No Yes
Observations 3,833 3,833 3,833 3,833
Note: All coefficients are from separate models. All models estimated by OLS. Clustered
standard errors (by individual) in parentheses. * Result significant at the 10% level. ** Result
significant at the 5% level. *** Result significant at the 1% level. FD - First-differences; LDV
- Lagged dependent variable.
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Table A8: Using natural log transformation of wealth instead of IHS
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel A: Hours of work
Pooled FD LDV LDV
Cancer -3.888** -3.246** -3.452** -3.473**
(1.527) (1.509) (1.390) (1.374)
Wave dummies No Yes No Yes
Region dummies No No No Yes
Period t− 1 controls No No No Yes
Observations 3,179 3,179 3,179 3,179
(5) (6) (7) (8)
Panel B: Working Panel C: In labor force
Pooled Pooled Pooled Pooled
Cancer -0.124*** -0.120*** -0.139*** -0.133***
(0.042) (0.041) (0.042) (0.041)
Wave dummies No Yes No Yes
Region dummies No Yes No Yes
Period t− 1 controls No Yes No Yes
Observations 3,179 3,179 3,179 3,179
(9) (10) (11) (12)
Panel D: Hours of work (if working)
Pooled FD LDV LDV
Cancer -0.678 -0.926 -0.764 -0.868
(1.614) (1.351) (1.254) (1.241)
Wave dummies No Yes No Yes
Region dummies No No No Yes
Period t− 1 controls No No No Yes
Observations 2,312 2,312 2,312 2,312
Note: All coefficients are from separate models. All models estimated by OLS. Clustered
standard errors (by individual) in parentheses. * Result significant at the 10% level. ** Result
significant at the 5% level. *** Result significant at the 1% level. FD - First-differences; LDV
- Lagged dependent variable.
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Table A9: Demographic and health variables for hours groups
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)







Age 70.29 3.76 68.93 3.49 14.05 0.38
Non-white 0.12 0.32 0.16 0.36 -4.51 -0.12
College 0.49 0.50 0.46 0.50 2.86 0.08
Married 0.88 0.33 0.86 0.35 1.90 0.05
Poor health 0.15 0.36 0.15 0.36 0.38 0.01
Smoker (ever) 0.68 0.47 0.67 0.47 1.21 0.03
Smoker (now) 0.10 0.30 0.12 0.33 -2.36 -0.06
Drink alcohol 0.62 0.49 0.59 0.49 1.79 0.05
Obese 0.24 0.43 0.26 0.44 -1.81 -0.05
Spouse working 0.33 0.47 0.39 0.49 -4.84 -0.13
Self-employed 0.40 0.49 0.38 0.49 1.19 0.03
Observations 2,556 3,046
Note: Nor-diff - Normalized differences.
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